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complaints here are not justiciable but rather matters of policy to
be met and resolved in legislative forum. Appellants appear-
ance in the trial court after lawful arrest was for violation of
a valid statute in this jurisdiction and his guilt of the charge
was properly established after trial. That his chronic alcolohic
condition needs further treatment and attention does not affect
that conviction 28
Appellant contended further that criminal prosecution of a chronic
alcoholic resulted in cruel and unusual punishment in light of the Robin-
sot; decision. The court refused to sustain this contention however, stating
that a separate opinion by Chief Judge Bazelon in Hutcherson v. United
States,29 explaining the holding in the Robinson decision, made it in-
applicable to the present case. The court then remarked:
In the instant case appellant was not punished because of his
addiction to alcohol He was convicte for being intoxicated
in public. Any person, whether an alcoholic or not, who is
drunk in a public place in the District of Columbia, is subject
to the same penalties.30 (emphasis added).
The result in the Easter case is not conclusive. If an appeal of the de-
cision is perfected, the outcome of that appeal will bear watching, espe-
cially in light of the more recent result reached in the Driver case. How
much effect Driver case will have is uncertain at this moment. This much
is certain however: the Driver case will not go unnoticed and, in light of
the United States Supreme Court's position in the Robinson case, there
is every reason to suppose that both of these decisions will control any
ruling the Court might be called upon to make in regard to prosecutions
of chronic alcoholics.
John Keefer
PRESENT ENFORCEMENT OF FTC CLAYTON ACT ORDERS
ISSUED PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF THE FINALITY ACT.
In FTC v. Jantzen, Inc.,' the Federal Trade Commission sought judicial
enforcement of a cease and desist order issued in 1959, against Jantzen,
based on an alleged violation of section 2(d) of the Clayton Act.2 Prior
to the filing of the petition in this case in early 1965, no proceedings had
been begun by either party in any court. Judicial enforcement was sought
28 Easter v. District of Columbia, supra note 25, at 628.
29 345 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1965).30 Easter v. District of Columbia, supra note 25, at 628.
1356 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1966).
2 (RoBiNsoN-PATMAN Act) 49 Star. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. S 13(d)
(1964), amending 38 Stat 730 (1914).
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under the Clayton Finality Act,3 which was passed in 1959, subsequent
to the issuance of the order against Jantzen. Jantzen admitted certain vio-
lations of the cease and desist order, but took the position that the order
was invalid, and even if it were valid, there was no method provided by
law for it's enforcement. The Federal Trade Commission, however, main-
tained that the court could enforce the Commission's orders issued prior
to the enactment of the Clayton Finality Act under section 2 of that act.4
It was contended that while this section provided that the new enforce-
ment procedures should not apply to any proceeding initiated before the
enactment of the amending act, the old procedures were retained to en-
force these prior orders.5 Any other holding would be contrary to the
congressional purpose. The commission concluded by urging that unless
its views were "... . accepted, 'forty-five years of Clayton Act enforcement
and almost 400 orders to cease and desist would be wiped from the
books'."6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that,
except for one very limited exception, the courts had no jurisdiction to
enforce Clayton Act orders issued prior to the July 23, 1959 Act," amend-
ing the Clayton Act's order enforcement provisions. Congress, in amend-
ing the Clayton Act to make orders thereunder final and enforceable in
the same manner as the cease and desist orders under the Federal Trade
Commission Act,8 repealed the provision authorizing the court of appeals
to enforce such orders. The one exception to this construction applied to
Clayton orders issued prior to enactment where proceedings had already
been initiated by the Commission in the court of appeals.
With this holding, the court left the Commission without a means of
enforcing "almost 400" prior orders, similar to the order in Jantzen. In
effect, the Commission must now start anew by issuing a new cease and
desist order when it finds a violation of an old order. At first glance, this
would seem to be inconsistent with the purpose of the bill as stated in
the legislative history:
The purpose of the bill ... is to facilitate enforcement of the
prohibitions in the Clayton Act.... The bill as amended would
make final cease-and-desist orders issued by the [Commission]
... with jurisdiction under section 11 of the Clayton Act...
in the same manner as cease-and-desist orders now become final
when issued by the Federal Trade Commission pursuant pro-
373 Star. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964).4 Earlier in Sperry Rand Co. v. FTC, 288 F.2d 403 (D.C. 1961), the
court refused to apply the enforcement procedures of the Clayton FinalityAct
to cease and desist orders issued prior to the act.
5 FTC v. Jantzen, Inc., supra note 1, at 257; see also, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
NEWS 1804, 1807 (86th Cong. 1st Sess. 1959).
6 FTC v. Jantzen, Inc., supra note 1, at 259.
7Clayton Finality Act, 73 Stat 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. q 21 (1964).
838 Star. 717 (1914), as amended by the Wheeler-Lea Act, 52 Star. 111(1938).
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cedures that are set forth in section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.0
However, as the Supreme Court has pointed out on numerous occa-
sions,10 the "purpose" is not exclusively controlling; meaning is deter-
mined by examining the legislative words in light of their purpose. Jus-
tice Frankfurter, quoting Justice Holmes, pointed out: ". . . (S]ince 'a
page of history is worth a volume of logic,' courts have looked into the
background of statutes, the mischief to be checked and the good that was
designed....,"- The court will consider the legislative history to clarify
the purpose, for when one knows and understands the circumstances under
which the phrase is uttered, he gains clarity and insight into the mean-
ing of the phrase. The use of "purpose" and "history" by the Supreme
Court to clarify statutory words is:
[IOuminously shown in an oponion written by Mr. Justice Gold-
berg in FTC v. Sun Oil Co ...... In this opinion, involving the
construction of § 2 (b) of the Robinson-Patman Act, Justice
Goldberg first considers the language of the statute, giving the
words their normal and usual meaning.... Next he seeks to
determine if the interpretation of the language is consonant
with the overall rationality and broader statutory consistency
and legislative purpose. A review of legislative history . .
and legislative purpose . . . are separated in the opinion, and
comparing the two, Justice Goldberg says that from the funda-
mental 'purposes' of the Act, we obtain guidance more im-
pressive than that found in the recited legislative history....
Actually, a review of the legislative history expounded by the
Justice shows that it further clarifies the 'purpose' and could
well have been placed in the same section for discussion.
Finally Justice Goldberg clearly rejects application of the legis-
lative purpose; he says that we are bound by the congressional
words .... 12
Both the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act, when
first enacted in 1914, contained substantially identical provisions relating
to the enforcement of cease and desist orders. Under these laws as orig-
inally enacted, a full scale administrative proceeding followed by the
issuance of a cease and desist order was but a preliminary step in the
prevention of violations. The cease and desist order had no practical
efficacy at this point, nor did the order become final within a specified
number of days. Before any consequence attached to a violation of the
0 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1804 (86th Cong. 1st Sess. 1959).1OE.g., Brooks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 182 (1964); United States v.
Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86 (1964); SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); United States v. Staph, 375 U.S. 118 (1963).
11 Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLUM L.
REv. 527, 543 (1947) (Footnote omitted).
12 Thomas, Statutory Construction When Legislation is Viewed as a Logal
Institution, 3 HARv. J. LEGIs. 191, 204-05 n.58 (1966) (Citations omitted).
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order it must have been reinforced by a judicial decree of enforcement.
To obtain the enforcement decree in the court of appeals, a second viola-
don had to be shown. This was done by the Commissions again ordering
an investigation, appointing a hearing officer, and, usually, holding a hear-
ing. If a violation was found, the Commission then sought enforcement
in the court of appeals. No penalty attached to this second violation, other
than the entry by the court of a decree enforcing the order. The order
was thus still lacking practical efficacy, but thereafter, contempt of court
penalties could be imposed by a showing of another violation. This would,
however, require still a third hearing before the agency as to any disputed
factual question, and a review there of by the court of appeals. Suc-
cinctly stated, there must have been a first violation of the acts before
the cease and desist order was issued. There must then have been a sec-
ond violation before the court order could be made legally binding, and
even then it was binding only as to a third and subsequent violation.
Not surprisingly, this very clumsy and time consuming procedure was
severely criticized. In 1938 Congress responded; the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act was amended by the Wheeler-Lea Act.13 The Wheeler-Lea
Act provided that cease and desist orders issued pursuant to section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act became final upon the expiration of
60 days unless challenged by the defendant within that period of time
by application to the United States Court of Appeals having jurisdiction.
In the event the order is challenged and judicial review is sought, the
FTC cease and desist order becomes final upon "the court affirmation of
the order. Once final, either through lapse of time or by court affirmance,
it's violation is punishable by fine. Needless to say, the Wheeler-Lea Act
gave the Commission a quicker, much more effective means of enforcing
it's cease and desist orders under the Federal Trade Commission Act.
However, the Clayton Act remained unchanged leaving the Commission
with the same ineffectual, cumbersome procedure it had always had.
For more than twenty years the Federal Trade Commission sought re-
lief from the procedural handicaps in the enforcement provisions of the
Clayton Act. Following the United States Supreme Court's 1952 decision
in FTC v. Ruberoid Co.,11 recognition of the need for amendatory legis-
lation increased. Prior to the Ruberoid decision, the Federal Trade Com-
mission had obtained judicial enforcement of it's Clayton orders by cross
petitioning, in those cases where defendants petitioned for judicial review.
In Ruberoid the Supreme Court held that the appellate court had nojurisdiction to issue a judicial enforcement order until the FTC had
established that its order had been violated or that violation was im-
minent. This decision was to further handicap the Commission's attempts
to enforce cease and desist orders under the Clayton Act.
On July 23, 1959, Congress passed the Clayton Finality Act, which in
13 52 Star. 111 (1938).
14343 U.S. 470 (1952).
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substance, does for the Clayton Act orders what the Wheeler-Lea Act did
for FTC orders. As observed by the court in the Jantzen case the finality
act is:
LA]Imost verbatim the same as section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act as amended by the Wheeler-Lea Act. The effect
of the statute is to produce a revised section 11 of the Clayton
Act, containing 12 paragraphs designated (a) through (1), and
providing the same method of review at the instance of the
respondent only, the same power of the court, the same time
limitation, the same rules as to finality, and the same civil pen-
alties for violations as does ammended section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.' 5
With the passage of the Clayton Finality Act, the enforcement pro-
cedures for Clayton orders and FTC orders, issued by the Federal Trade
Commission since 1959, have been the same.
One major difference between the two amending Acts, and one of
particular importance in the study of Jantzen, is the provision in which
cease and desist orders, issued prior to the effective dates of the Act, were
enforced. Section 5 (a) of the Wheeler-Lea Act provides:
Sec. 5 (a) In case of an order by the Federal Trade Commission
to cease and desist, served on or before the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the sixty-day period . . . shall begin on the
date of the enactment of this Act.' 6
The corresponding section in the Clayton Finality Act did not do this;
it provides:
Sec. 2. The amendments made by section 1 shall have no ap-
plication to any proceedings initiated before the date of enact-
ment of the Act under the third or fourth paragraph of section
11of the... [Clayton Act] . . . . Each such proceeding shall
be governed by the provisions of such section as they existed
on the day preceding the date of enactment of this Act.17
Thus, we must look to the wording of Section 2, and in particular, the
word "proceeding" to determine whether it includes all orders issued
prior to enactment or is it limited to those proceedings which have been
initiated in the court of appeals before the date of enactment. In doing
this, we see that the word "proceedings" is limited by the words ". . .
initiated ... under the third or fourth paragraph of section 11. ..
Therefore we must look to paragraphs three and four to determine the
meaning Congress intended.
Paragraph 3 of section 11 of the Clayton Act as it appeared prior to
enactment of the Clayton Finality Act provided that upon failure or
15 FTC v. Jantzen, Inc. supra note 1, at 256.
16 52 Stat. 111, 117 (1938).
1773 Stat. 243, 245-46 (1959).2s Ibid.
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neglect to obey an order, the Commission could apply to the United
States Court of Appeals for enforcement. It further provided for the
jurisdiction of the court of appeals, the taking additional evidence, and
the finality of the order. It seems dear that the only "proceedings"
initiated under paragraph 3 is that in the United States Court of Appeals.
The fourth paragraph provides a review, for the party charged, of any
cease and desist order issued by the Commission. The proceedings dis-
cussed in this paragraph are likewise initiated in the court of appeals.
The cease and desist orders mentioned in the third and fourth paragraphs
arise from proceedings covered by the second paragraph. Thus, if the
second paragraph had been included along with the third and fourth
paragraphs in section 2 of the amending act, it would be easy to con-
clude that Congress intended this section to apply to all orders issued
prior to enactment. However, considering the statutory words as they
are, it appears the court was right in holding that the former enforcement
procedures were expressly continued in effect for a very limited purpose-
the completion of proceedings for enforcement initiated by the Commis-
sion in a court of appeals.
In reaching the conclusion stated above the court of appeals relied
primarily on the language of the statute. "It should again be emphasized
that in applying statutory provisions, courts must limit themselves to the
words. Legislative aims, purpose, and policy can be used only to add
clarity to the words."'1 The purpose of the Clayton Finality Act was to
provide for a more expeditious enforcement of the cease and desist orders
issued thereunder. Under the old enforcement procedures, if after the
Clayton cease and desist order had been issued, the Commission suspected
or found a further violation it would, as a practical matter, begin again
with a full scale proceeding. Even then the order was not enforceable
until another violation was shown, which required another processing.
The second and third steps of this procedure, following the original is-
suance of the order, were definitely "ineffectual", "awkward" and "time
consuming." 2 0 Under section 2 of the finality act as it is interpreted by the
court in Jantzen, instead of the extended second and third step to get
enforcement and finality of an old cease and desist order, the Commission
will issue a new order. The new cease and desist order will then become
final within 60 days or, if appealed, when adjudicated by the court. Al-
though the Commission experienced much difficulty in attempting to
gain enforcement of this particular cease and desist order, it will not be
as difficult, nor time consuming to enforce the remaining "400" prior
orders under this court's interpretation of section 2. Apparently Congress
felt that the new method of enforcement, even after one step of the old,
would be quicker.
William S. Doenges
• 'Thomas, stpra note 12, at 202.
20 FTC v. Jantzen, Inc., spra note 1, at 260 n.11.
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